The role of bond underwriter affiliation in fixed income funds´ investment choice and performance by Supper, Tanja
A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of an International 








THE ROLE OF UNDERWRITER AFFILIATION IN FIXED INCOME FUNDS’ 

































Using data on 1,550 U.S. fixed income funds, the aim of this thesis is to investigate how the 
affiliation to a bond underwriting firm affects selected facets of funds’ investment behavior and 
returns. All in all, their portfolios are not found to be biased towards bonds the affiliated insti-
tution acted as an underwriter for, however, some signs of support for these holdings are no-
ticeable at times of fund outflows and close to their issuance. The effect of underwriter-affilia-
tion on funds’ performance is insignificant, suggesting that funds’ shareholders are neither bet-
ter nor worse off than others that invest into independent counterparts. 
 
Title: The role of underwriter affiliation in fixed income funds’ investment choice and perfor-
mance 
Keywords: fixed income funds, bond underwriting, underwriter-affiliation, conflicts of inter-















This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), 
POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) 
and POR Norte (Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209). 
2 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The control of an asset management firm by a conglomerate that provides another financial 
service under the same roof naturally raises the potential for competing or conflicting interests 
to arise. Indeed, already in 2003, a Wall Street Journal article by Lucchetti reports that a Chief 
Investment Officer at Deutsche Bank’s (DB) asset management unit was asked by a DB under-
writing executive to “be a team player” and invest in the newly issued shares of the struggling 
media firm Vivendi Universal SA, for which DB assumed the role of the lead underwriter. 
Stephen M. Cutler, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Director from 2001 to 2005 
(SIFMA, n.d.), further expresses his concerns that “an asset manager might feel pressured to 
invest in companies that its investment banking affiliate had underwritten” (2003). Spillover 
effects within financial conglomerates and their ramifications on affiliated funds’ behavior have 
nowadays, indeed, been investigated from different angles in the academic literature. The pur-
pose of this thesis is to analyse a (to the author’s best knowledge) still fairly uncharted potential 
conflict of interest that may arise from investment banks’ bond underwriting activity, which 
turns them into a seller of bonds, and their ownership of fixed income funds, at the same time 
turning them into a buyer of bonds. In fact, the absence of “Chinese walls”1 between a firm’s 
equity underwriting business and its fund management division has already been indicated by 
prior research works. For instance, a study by Johnson and Marietta-Westberg (JM) (2009) 
suggests that investment bank-affiliated asset management arms are able to take advantage of 
valuable inside information, whereas in a paper by Hao and Yan (2012), it is shown that equity 
mutual funds that belong to investment banks serve as a vehicle to support worse performing 
client stocks. The potential effects of bond underwriter-affiliation on fixed income funds’ be-
havior, however, seem to remain widely unexplored, notwithstanding the larger size of the 
 
1 “Chinese walls” are a metaphor for a barrier that intends to avoid the communication between divisions if it 
could result in legally or ethically questionable business activities (Kenton, 2020). 
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global bond market compared to the equity market (SIFMA Research, 2020) and that, on aver-
age, a little more than 3/5 of the world’s leading banks’
2 underwriting revenue is accounted for 
by their bond underwriting business3. In order to contribute to the closure of this gap in the 
empirical research, this works aims to understand and discuss whether the affiliation to a bond 
underwriting firm changes fixed income funds’ behavior in terms of their investments in cor-
porate bonds and, in particular, if it may entail support for those bonds, for which the umbrella 
institution was mandated as an underwriter. Using a sample of 25,863 bond issuances in the 
period from 2002 to 2017 and reported holdings of 1,550 U.S. open-end fixed income funds 
between 2003 and 2019, the major aspects of research include the portfolio composition of 
affiliated funds, factors that determine their holdings of “client bonds”4, affiliated funds’ be-
havior in the presence of negative fund flows and in the period after the issuance of affiliated 
bonds and the influence of underwriter-affiliation on fixed income funds’ returns. Furthermore, 
the use of data on the U.S. market seems particularly appropriate for the purpose of this thesis, 
as fixed income funds’ total assets under management experienced an increase of approx. 
247.1% between 2005 and 2019 and totalled about $4.7tn, or 22.1% of all U.S. mutual funds’ 
assets in 2019 (SIFMA Research, 2020). They are, thus, of great economic interest. According 
to the results, the implications of bond funds’ underwriter-affiliation are ambiguous: On the one 
hand, affiliated fixed income funds seem to slightly overweight client bonds in comparison to 
unaffiliated entities – which can especially be observed for top 10 bank-controlled asset man-
agers – however, their portfolios are not biased towards these holdings. At the time of negative 
fund flows, it is noteworthy that affiliated funds reduce their portfolio weight of unaffiliated 
bonds and, additionally, the probability of investing in a bond in the quarter of its issuance is 
 
2 Top 10 banks acc. the Financial Times on the basis of fees earned as of 28-Sep-20 (Financial Times, 2020a) 
3 On average, about 62.7% in 2018 and about 63.0% in 2019 (own analysis, using annual reports’ data of JP 
Morgan, Goldman Sachs & Co, Bofa Securities Inc, Citi, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank) 
4 Synonym to describe bonds underwritten by funds’ parent banks, also termed in this study “affiliated bonds” 
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positively influenced by a fund’s affiliation to one of the bond’s underwriters. On the other 
hand, no evidence is found in the main analysis that funds’ performance is determined by the 
affiliation to a bond underwriter, which could suggest that Chinese walls allow the independent 
operation of affiliated fixed income funds. The remaining structure of this thesis is organised 
as follows: A review of related literature will first be carried out (4-7), followed by the devel-
opment of the hypotheses (7-10), a description of the data sample and the methodology ap-
proach (10-17) and a demonstration of the results (17-23). The thesis concludes with an evalu-
ation of the findings achieved, the study’s limitations and an outlook on possible future research 
(23-25). 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Spillover effects arising in financial conglomerates and the resulting implications for affiliated 
funds’ investment decisions have been investigated from different angles in the empirical liter-
ature. One strand of research, for instance, focuses on bank-affiliated funds’ behavior towards 
securities that were issued by their controlling bank. Based on a sample that consists of Spanish 
financial conglomerates, evidence arises in a study by Golez and Marin (2015) that bank-affil-
iated funds’ trading is supportive of their controlling bank’s stock price around seasoned equity 
offerings, after bad corporate news and before expected as well as after unexpected price drops. 
In another study exploring the Spanish mutual fund industry, Gil-Bazo, Hoffmann and Mayor-
domo (2020) find that bank-affiliation is related to higher purchases of parent banks’ bonds 
issued in the primary market (on average, +0.04%). The observed funding support, which is 
additionally associated with bond overpricing, especially increases in periods of financial dis-
tress that are accompanied by limited access to funding sources. In addition and in a slightly 
different research direction, Bagattini, Fecht and Weber (2018) document that the ownership of 
mutual funds allowed German banks to sell off their proprietary holdings of risky sovereign 
bonds during the 2010 to 2012 sovereign debt crisis in Europe. 
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A further line of studies, which may be considered as most closely related to the empirical part 
of this thesis, examines conflicts of interest between financial institutions’ underwriting and 
asset management divisions. For instance, a paper by Marques (2017) addresses the allocation 
of bond issuances in Brazil between 2005 and 2015 and delivers evidence that the allocation of 
bonds to affiliated mutual funds entails a negative “excess return” at the time of their issuance. 
Based on a sample that covers mutual funds, hedge funds and institutional funds from 1990 to 
2008, Berzins, Liu and Trzcinka (2013) discover that the affiliation with an investment bank is 
accompanied by a decline in a fund’s alpha by about 46 basis points per year. The work by Hao 
and Yan (2012), analysing data on U.S. equity mutual funds in the period from 1992 to 2004, 
finds that investment bank-affiliated funds are inclined to overweight recently issued clients’ 
stock in their portfolios and that ⅓ to ½ of the observed performance gap with independent 
peers could be traced back to their IPO (initial public offering) client holdings. According to 
the authors, these findings are consistent with the idea that investment bank-affiliation may 
induce asset management units to act in favor of the interests of the underwriting business, even 
if this is detrimental to funds’ shareholders (“conflict of interest hypotheses”). The use of affil-
iated funds as a vehicle to enhance investment banks’ reputation for introducing strong firms 
to the IPO market is also empirically proven by JM (2009). In addition, a further analysis of an 
international sample of equity mutual funds between 2000 and 2010 reveals that the affiliation 
to a commercial banking group leads to an underperformance relative to unaffiliated funds by 
about 92 basis points per year, which is linked to the overweighting of borrowing firms’ stocks. 
This “strategy” increases a bank’s chances of being selected as a lead arranger of lending deals 
in the future (Ferreira, Matos and Pires, 2018). 
While some of the previously cited studies show that the provision of diverse financial services 
under one roof is able to induce a conflict of interest, which could have an adverse effect on  
funds’ performance, other studies, by contrast, highlight how close ties within financial 
6 
institutions can entail positive effects for funds’ shareholders. For instance, Mola and Guidolin 
(2009) observe that sell-side analysts tend to release favorable recommendations about a stock 
following the investment in that stock by affiliated mutual funds. Current research (Mooney, 
2020) points out that affiliated mutual funds engage in the pre-announcement trading in stocks 
of merger targets that are advised by their controlling investment bank, which allows them to 
realise highly positive abnormal returns. In a further analysis conducted by Ritter and Zhang 
(2007), whose research focuses on U.S. investment banks’ allocation process of IPOs, some 
evidence arises that during the so-called internet bubble period of 1999 to 2000 deeply under-
priced IPO shares were preferentially sold to underwriters’ affiliated mutual funds. This finding 
is considered supportive of the “nepotism hypothesis” (as termed by the authors), according to 
which hot IPOs can be used to boost the returns of affiliated funds, subsequently attracting more 
money inflows. In a similar vein, results achieved by JM (2009) hint underwriter-affiliated 
funds’ ability to trade on the basis of superior information (“superior information hypothesis”), 
which is reflected by the realisation of higher market-adjusted returns (+7.7% per year) in com-
parison to asset managers whose parent banks did not lead-underwrite the IPO. A recent study 
by Saengchote and Sthienchoak (2020) based on data from Thailand reaches a similar conclu-
sion by finding evidence that lead underwriter-affiliated equity mutual funds are likelier to hold 
underpriced IPO issues. With regard to co-manager-affiliated peers, however, the results are 
consistent with the “quid pro quo hypothesis”, according to which bank-controlled funds can 
be utilised to support the stocks of IPO clients (similar to JM, 2009; Hao and Yan, 2012). As 
argued in the study’s introduction, the possible reward of obtaining lead underwriting mandates 
in future deals could provide co-managing firms with an incentive to support their clients’ eq-
uity issues. Lastly, Massa and Rehman (2008), whose analysis’ underlying sample includes all 
the actively managed equity funds in the U.S. between 1993 and 2004, investigate the influence 
of banks’ lending activities on the investment choice of their affiliated asset managers. Their 
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study illustrates that bank-affiliated funds selectively overweight stocks of their controlling 
bank’s borrowing firms around the time of the new loan initiation, which is associated with 
superior risk-adjusted returns in the short-term. This finding is further supportive of the claim 
that inside information may be exchanged between the different divisions of a financial con-
glomerate. 
Other closely related research areas observe that the superior performance of mutual funds that 
are run by graduates from an elite university is attributable to their better ties with underwriting 
firms, subsequently facilitating the access to underpriced IPO allocations (Hwang, Titman and 
Wang, 2018). Finally, Ma, Tang and Gómez (2019) discover that the use of explicit perfor-
mance-based incentives as well as deferred compensation is positively related to the strength 
of potential agency conflicts, proxied by, i.a., the advisor’s affiliation with a bank. 
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Does fund size influence the fraction of affiliated bond holdings? (H1) 
As is evident from the review of existing literature, an affiliated asset management unit that 
holds client firms’ shares in its portfolio may contribute to strengthening the conglomerate’s 
underwriting or lending division, even if this causes detriment to the funds’ shareholders (e.g. 
JM, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2018). Empirical evidence suggests that this conflict of interest is not 
only taken advantage of by less reputable investment banks, where one would expect a consid-
erably greater incentive, but also by the ones that rank among the top-tier (Hao and Yan, 2012). 
Further, considering that eight of the top 10 banks’ investment advisory companies5 rank among 
the world’s top 50 asset management firms in terms of total assets under management (ADV 
Ratings, 2020), one could assume that there may exist a positive association between fixed 
income funds’ size and their portfolio fraction of affiliated bonds. This claim also seems 
 
5 Top 10 banks acc. to the Financial Times on the basis of fees earned as of 28-Sep-20 (Financial Times, 2020a) 
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reasonable from a theoretical standpoint, as increases in funds’ size may translate into enhanced 
possibilities to support bonds, whose underwriting syndicates include the parent bank. In a first 
regression analysis, it is thus to be investigated whether different proxies for fund size positively 
contribute to the portfolio weight that is invested in affiliated bonds: 
H1: “As fund size increases, the portfolio weight of affiliated bonds is expected to rise as well.” 
3.2 How do fund outflows affect the variation in the fraction of (un)affiliated bonds? (H2) 
Approximately half of the reporting dates in this thesis’ sample of affiliated funds (50.9%) 
exhibit negative fund flows, arising as the amount of investor redemptions exceeds the amount 
of new investor inflows (TheStreet, n.d). If the holdings of liquid assets are not sufficient to 
meet the requested outflows, fund withdrawals could imply the necessity to convert underlying 
securities into cash (Indexperts, 2019) and trade them in the secondary market. In such event, 
one way of how affiliated funds might support their controlling bank, or rather “please” clients 
whose bonds were underwritten by the parent bank, could be by reducing unaffiliated bond 
holdings to a greater extent than affiliated ones. This leads to the second testable hypothesis: 
H2: “Periods of negative fund flows are accompanied by a reduction in the fraction of unaffil-
iated bond holdings rather than affiliated bond holdings.” 
3.3 Does the affiliation to a bond’s underwriter impact a fund’s participation in the invest-
ment in that bond in the period after its issuance? (H3) 
A further occasion where fixed income funds’ behavior may be affected by the affiliation to an 
underwriting firm may arise in the period after the issuance of bond offerings, in which the 
controlling bank participated as an underwriter. Indeed, one may argue that affiliated funds’ 
direct investment in recently issued client firms’ bonds is utilised as a tool to promote the un-
derwriter’s reputation for being able to successfully place new securities on the market (see a 
similar argument proposed by JM, 2009). Further, one may recall the study by Hao and Yan 
(2012) that discovered evidence for investment bank-affiliated equity mutual funds’ tendency 
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to overweight recently issued client firms’ stocks, interpreted as an effort to provide price sup-
port and strengthen investment banks’ relationships. Thus, it would be interesting to analyse if 
similar signs of support can be identified in bond funds’ behavior in the post-issuance period 
of affiliated bonds. One can formulate the third testable hypothesis: 
H3: “The probability of a fund participating in the investment in a bond during the quarter of 
its issuance is positively affected by the affiliation to one of the bond’s underwriters. In addi-
tion, the fraction of a bond’s offering amount held by a fund in the period of the bond’s issuance 
is anticipated to be higher in the presence of an affiliation to one of the bond’s underwriters.” 
3.4 Can performance differences within fixed income funds be attributed to the portfolio 
weight of affiliated bond holdings or bond underwriter-affiliation? (H4, H5) 
In a next and final analysis, the aim is to understand whether one of the two hypotheses that 
have been reported in the literature on spillover effects in financial groups with an asset man-
agement arm, namely “conflict of interest hypothesis” or “information advantage hypothesis”6, 
can be inferred from underwriter-affiliated fixed income funds’ returns. For instance, one may 
think of the studies carried out by Hao and Yan (2012), Berzins et al. (2013) as well as Ferreira 
et al. (2018), all of which revealed that bank-affiliated asset managers underperform stand-
alone entities. Other research, in turn, argues that close ties with a bank may entail superior 
returns, attributed to affiliated asset management firms’ privilege of trading based on an infor-
mation advantage (e.g. Massa and Rehman, 2008; Hwang et al., 2018). On the one hand, one 
could thus assume affiliated fixed income funds’ ability to base their investment decisions on 
valuable inside information obtained from their umbrella institution’s underwriting connec-
tions, as a result of which they “cherry pick” those client bonds that will achieve higher returns. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that fixed income funds owned by an underwriting 
 
6 The names of the hypothesis were retrieved from the study by Ferreira et al. (2018). In a different study, for 
example, the “information advantage hypothesis” is known as “superior information hypothesis” and the “conflict 
of interest hypothesis” is termed “quid pro quo hypothesis” (JM, 2009). 
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institution may feel pressure to or be utilised as a vehicle to support client bonds that figure 
among worse performers. This leads to the suggestion of two contrasting hypotheses: 
H4: “The presence of underwriter-affiliation and higher portfolio weights of affiliated bond 
holdings are positively reflected in funds’ performance.” 
H5: “The presence of underwriter-affiliation and higher portfolio weights of affiliated bond 
holdings are negatively reflected in funds’ performance.” 
It may briefly be pointed out that the “skill hypothesis”, stated in the paper by Ferreira et al. 
(2018), further supports the claim of H5 that bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated 
ones. The hypothesis assumes that affiliated funds may be less incentivised to hire talented 
portfolio managers due to banks’ ability to provide bundled services. Independent asset man-
agement firms, in contrast, may be considered to provide more prestigious career opportunities. 
4 DATA SAMPLE 
4.1 Collection of data and preparatory procedures 
In order to construct the dataset for the analysis of the above-proposed hypotheses, fund data is 
originally obtained from the Morningstar database. The Morningstar report, which covers the 
period from January 31, 2003, to October 24, 2019, includes information on the asset holdings 
of 1,550 open-end fixed income funds that are domiciled in the U.S. The reporting frequencies 
of the sample funds vary from one to 207 times per year, with the most common reporting 
frequencies observed being quarterly and monthly. On average, the sample counts 845 funds 
per year, with the number of affiliated funds varying between 158 and 199. At this point, it 
needs to be remarked that the original dataset does not already contain the required information 
related to underwriter-affiliation. It is, thus, necessary to identify the funds that belong to a 
financial conglomerate7. For this purpose, the names of the affiliated funds are manually 
 
7 In the present analysis, “financial conglomerate” or “bank” are used as synonyms for the term “underwriter”. 
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matched with the names of the corresponding underwriting institutions. Where required, further 
information on the funds’ ultimate owners is obtained, drawing on a variety of sources, such as 
the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, Morningstar fund profiles and fund company websites. 
Within the scope of this matching process, any change in ownership that occurred at the under-
writer level, for instance as a result of post-crisis bank mergers – e.g. Bank of America’s acqui-
sition of Merrill Lynch, completed as of January 1, 2009 (Thomson Reuters, 2009) –, is  addi-
tionally taken into account. A more precise development of the dataset’s underlying funds is 
illustrated in Figure 1. As the chart shows, the share of affiliated funds, which has apart from a 
few variations slightly declined in the first two thirds of the observation period, stabilised at 
around 20% between 2014 and 2019. Indeed, this fraction matches statistics documented by 
recent literature studying an international sample of equity mutual funds (Ferreira et al., 2018). 
According to Ferreira et al. (2018), the fraction of commercial bank-affiliated equity mutual 
funds in the U.S. stood at 20% in 2010. Despite the focus of this thesis’ analysis on underwriter-
affiliated fixed income funds, considering that the sample funds are domiciled in the U.S. mar-
ket, one may say that the derived share of affiliated fixed income funds of about 20% during 
the last few years of the sample period seems quite plausible. In addition, in another study, Hao 
and Yan (2012, p.538) state that nearly one in four mutual funds in the U.S. were affiliated with 
an investment bank between 1992 and 2004, which is further in line with the results obtained 
from the matching process. After linking each affiliated fund to its controlling bank and in the 
event of a takeover to the new controlling bank as well as the completion date of the acquisition, 
the final step of the data preparation requires the identification of affiliated bond holdings. The 
term “affiliated bond holdings” is used in this study to describe a set of bonds in an affiliated 
fund’s portfolio whose underwriting syndicates include the respective fund’s parent bank. It is 
not significant whether the controlling bank assumed the role of the lead underwriter or acted 
merely as a co-managing syndicate member; in the present analysis solely the participation in 
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the underwriting syndicate is relevant. For this purpose, an additional dataset from the Mergent 
Fixed Income Securities (FISD) database8 is collected, covering 25,863 bond issues in the pe-
riod from 2002 to 2017, including information on the underwriting entities and bond-specific 
characteristics. Figure 2 illustrates the development of the newly issued bonds over time; the 
total number of underwriters amounts to 301. As each bond is assigned a unique identification 
number, referred to as CUSIP9, and fixed income funds’ holding data provided by Morningstar 
report the CUSIP numbers of bonds held in their portfolios, it is possible to identify for each 
affiliated fund and reporting date the bonds that are attributable to the category “affiliated bond 
holdings” and, at the same time, those classified as “unaffiliated bond holdings”. 
Once the data preparation stage is completed, the next step involves the aggregation of selected 
holding data at the fund-date level, which yields for each fund the portfolio weights of (for this 
thesis) relevant assets as of the respective reporting dates. In total, one can count 101,837 fund-
date pairs, of which 21,932 are attributable to affiliated funds. One can consult summary statis-
tics describing the distribution of the aggregated variables as well as a number of additionally 
added fund characteristics10 across all available fund-date pairs, in Table 1. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
While Panel A of Table 1 illustrates the summary statistics based on the entire sample, the mean 
values of the portfolio characteristics are depicted separately for stand-alone and underwriter-
controlled funds in Panel B. As can be seen, on average, the sample funds manage net assets 
worth approx. $1.9bn (median: $330mn) and witness net flows of about $9mn from one report-
ing date to the next; the average age of the funds is 13 years. Looking at Panel B, it is noteworthy 
that the mean values of affiliated and unaffiliated bond funds’ characteristics – considered on 
 
8 The bond issuance dataset, just like the funds’ holding data, was provided by the thesis’ supervisor. 
9 Abbreviation for Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (Investor.gov, n.d.) 
10 The data on the sample funds’ characteristics (specifically, total net assets at the fund and share class level, net 
flow at the fund level and expense ratio at the share class level) were provided by the thesis’ supervisor. 
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average across all fund-date pairs – do not differ essentially from each other. While it can be 
noted that affiliated funds are slightly larger in terms of their total net assets (approx. +$55mn), 
the average values of their net flows and quarterly returns are rather similar to those that could 
be derived for the unaffiliated entities. The slightly higher average expense ratio of affiliated 
fixed income funds in comparison to the one of unaffiliated funds (0.49% vs. 0.46%) may be 
explained by banks’ stronger presence in fund distribution and bank-affiliated funds’ resulting 
ability to charge higher fees (Ferreira et al., 2018). Next, concerning the average fraction of 
affiliated bond holdings, one can observe a value of 2.6% for affiliated funds (1.9% if one only 
takes into account bonds underwritten by affiliated lead underwriters, as can be seen in Panel 
C) in comparison to 2.1% for unaffiliated funds11. At first sight, it might thus be concluded that 
affiliated portfolios are slightly “overweight” in their holdings of bonds underwritten by the 
controlling bank. However, if one further looks at the average portfolio fraction that was un-
derwritten by the most “frequent underwriter”12, which amounts to 14.9%, it cannot be claimed 
that affiliated funds seem to actually tilt their portfolios towards bonds underwritten by their 
parent bank. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 3, only in 503 out of 21,932 (equivalent to 2.3%) 
fund-month observations, the most frequent underwriter is an affiliated underwriter. In addition, 
in Panel D of Table 1, the fund characteristics are illustrated in more detail for funds that are 
affiliated to an underwriting institution that ranks among the top 10 banks in the world and 
funds that are affiliated to a different underwriter. In order to undertake this classification, the 
Financial Times League Tables ranking based on fees earned in the first three quarters of 2020 
is used (Financial Times, 2020a). At this point, it may be remarked that this ranking is applied 
 
11 The portfolio weight of affiliated bonds held by an unaffiliated fund at a specific reporting date was calculated 
by first computing the portfolio fraction that is attributable to each underwriter that controls an asset management 
unit. Afterwards, an average value across these individual portfolio weights could be calculated for the respective 
unaffiliated fund-month pair. 
12 The designation “most frequent underwriter” describes the highest fraction of bonds in a fund’s portfolio under-
written by one single underwriter. 
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for the entire period under investigation. Here, one essential difference becomes evident: While 
a top 10 bank-affiliated fund invests, on average, about 7.8% of its assets in affiliated bonds, 
this fraction merely amounts to 0.3% for a fund that is affiliated to a different underwriter. 
Finally, Panel E reports the mean values of the main variables for selected fund style groups. 
In addition to the above-described summary statistics, Figure 4 depicts the average weight of 
affiliated bonds held by affiliated funds – further split into top 10 bank-affiliated funds and 
other underwriter-affiliated funds – and unaffiliated funds for each quarter of the sample pe-
riod13. In this way, it is possible to document the variable’s development across time. In line 
with the summary statistics, for the large majority of the sample period, affiliated funds are 
shaped by slightly higher fractions of affiliated bonds in comparison to underwriter-independ-
ent ones. While the overweighting can especially be observed for funds that are owned by a top 
10 bank, funds that are affiliated to a different underwriter exhibit a fairly minimal portfolio 
weight of affiliated bonds, close to zero percent. Furthermore, throughout the entire observation 
period, affiliated funds’ quarterly average fraction of bonds underwritten by the most frequent 
underwriter (see Figure 5) exceeds the quarterly average fraction of bonds underwritten by their 
affiliated underwriter (see Figure 4). The direct comparison of both figures, thus, does not point 
to any bias in affiliated funds’ portfolios towards bonds underwritten by the parent bank. Fi-
nally, it can be seen from Figure 6, which illustrates the average fraction of unaffiliated bond 
holdings per quarter, that the top 10 bank-controlled funds hold a notably lower portfolio weight 
of unaffiliated bonds in comparison to other affiliated peers for the majority of the sample pe-
riod. 
 
13 As there exist significant differences in the sample funds’ reporting frequencies, funds’ last reported information 
in a given quarter is used in order to calculate the average portfolio weight of affiliated bond holdings across the 
sample funds in that quarter. 
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5 METHODOLOGY 
After briefly introducing the data sample, in the following, the regression analyses used to ver-
ify the thesis’ hypotheses will be described. All the variables are defined in Table 2, and, where 
appropriate, an explanation on their computation and any necessary assumptions are provided. 
5.1 Does fund size influence the fraction of affiliated bond holdings? (H1) 
In order to test H1 (see chapter 3.1) and to investigate if fund size is a determinant of affiliated 
funds’ fractions of client bonds, a fixed effects linear model (“felm”) regression will be used: 
frac_afff,t = 
ß0 + ß1 log (TNAf,t) + ß2 log (avg_family_TNAf,q-1) 
+ ß3 no_family_fundsf,q-1 + ß4 aff_top_10f,t + 𝛿 Xf,t + αs + αt + f,t 
(1) 
“frac_afff,t” represents the portfolio weight of affiliated bond holdings, i.e. bonds underwritten 
by the parent bank, held by fund f at reporting date t. “αs” and “αt” denote investment-style (as 
assigned by Morningstar) and time (reporting-date) fixed effects in order to account for unob-
servable variation in the data. The measures that are used to approximate fund size are (1) TNA 
(total net assets) at reporting date t, (2) the average family TNA in the preceding quarter q-1, 
(3) the number of family funds in the preceding quarter q-1 and (4) a dummy variable that 
captures the affiliation to a top 10 bank. Lastly, “Xf,t” refers to vector of control variables that 
comprises selected fund- and portfolio-specific characteristics at reporting date t. 
5.2 How do fund outflows affect the variation in the fraction of (un)affiliated bonds? (H2) 
The claim asserted by H2 (see chapter 3.2), according to which affiliated funds reduce unaffil-
iated bond holdings rather than affiliated bond holdings in the event of negative fund flows, 
will be tested using the following felm regression equations: 
∆_frac_unafff,t (a)  
 ∆_frac_afff,t (b) 
diff_∆_frac_(un)afff,t (c) 
= ß0 + ß1 neg_net_flowf,t + 𝛿 Xf,t / q-1 + αs + αt + f,t (2) 
In total, three regression models will be estimated. The dependent variables are the changes in 
a fund’s fraction invested in unaffiliated (a) and affiliated (b) bond holdings between t and t-1 
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and the difference in both variations (=∆_frac_unafff,t - ∆_frac_afff,t) at point in time t (c). They 
will be regressed on a dummy variable that captures the presence of outflows (neg_net_flowf,t 
= 1), a vector of control variables (𝛿 Xf,t / q-1) and style as well as time fixed effects (αs, αt). 
5.3 Does the affiliation to a bond’s underwriter impact a fund’s participation in the invest-
ment in that bond in the period after its issuance? (H3) 
H3 (see chapter 3.3), which assumes a fund’s probability to participate in the investment of a 
bond in the quarter of its issuance to increase in the presence of the affiliation to one of the 
bond’s underwriters, will be tested using the following logit regression model: 
inv_off_amtf,b,q(iss) = ß0 + ß1 aff_bondf,b,q(iss) + 𝛿 Xf,b,q(iss) + αc / αt + f,b,q(iss) (3) 
“inv_off_amtf,b,q(iss)” is the dependent variable, assuming the value 1 if a fund participates in the 
investment in a bond during the quarter of issuance and 0 otherwise. “aff_bondf,b,q(iss)” denotes 
a dummy variable that captures a fund’s affiliation to a bond’s underwriter during its quarter of 
issuance (=1). “Xf,b,q(iss)” relates to a vector of fund-specific control variables during the bond’s 
quarter of issuance that may affect the trading behavior of a fund, all of which are described in 
more detail in Table 2. “αc” and “αt” denote CUSIP and time fixed effects, respectively. The 
second regression equation that is used to test H3, which further assumes that a fund’s acquired 
fraction of a bond’s offering amount in the quarter of issuance is higher if the fund is affiliated 
to one of the bond’s underwriters, has a similar structure as Equation 3. However, as a felm 
regression, it uses the fraction of a bond’s offering amount held by a fund during the quarter of 
issuance (a) (similarly to Gil-Bazo et al., 2020) and, as an alternative, a fund’s average fraction 
of the offering amount held within one year after the issuance (b) as the dependent variable: 
frac_off_amtf,b,q(iss) (a)  
avg_frac_off_amtf,b,t(iss)+12m (b) 
= 
ß0 + ß1 aff_bondf,b,q(iss) + 𝛿 Xf,b,q(iss)  
+ αc + αt + f,b,q(iss) 
(4) 
Further, the number of observations of the dependent variables in each quarter (as is the case 
for the dependent variable in Equation 3) is derived by multiplying the number of bonds issued 
in a quarter with the number of funds, for which holding information is available in that quarter. 
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5.4 Can performance differences within fixed income funds be attributed to the portfolio 
weight of affiliated bond holdings or bond underwriter-affiliation? (H4, H5) 
The final hypotheses, which postulate affiliated funds to outperform stand-alone ones (H4) on 
the one hand and the opposite on the other (H5), are tested using the following felm regressions: 
cum_returnq+1 = ß0 + ß1 frac_afff,t + ß2 aff_top_10f,t + 𝛿 Xf,t / q + αs + αt + f,t (5) 
cum_returnq+1 = ß0 + ß1 aff_top_10f,t + 𝛿 Xf,t / q + αs + αt + f,t (6) 
“cum_returnq+1” denotes a fund’s cumulative three month return in a specific quarter. While 
Equation 5 is used for the subsample of affiliated funds; Equation 6 is used for the entire sample 
of funds. In addition, as could be seen in Figure 4, fixed income funds owned by a top 10 bank 
exhibit notably higher portfolio weights of affiliated bonds than other affiliated funds, for which 
this fraction is close to zero percent. On that note, a dummy variable that captures the affiliation 
to a top 10 bank rather than simply the affiliation to any underwriter is used. Consistent with 
existing literature (e.g. Ferreira et al., 2018) that uses lagged control variables to describe funds’ 
returns, the dependent variable “cum_ret” is analysed for the quarter that follows a fund’s re-
porting date t, whereas the explanatory and control variables relate to point in time t or q. 
6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Does fund size influence the fraction of affiliated bond holdings? (H1) 
As expected, model (1) in Table 3, which illustrates the main regression results, shows that 
affiliation to one of the top 10 banks in the world, the first proxy for funds’ size, is positively 
associated with the fraction of affiliated bond holdings; on average, the latter is anticipated to 
increase by 7.71 percentage points (p-value < 0.01). At this point, it should be borne in mind 
that merely the ranking as a top 10 bank may be indicative of a stronger presence in the under-
writing business in comparison to other underwriters, which, in turn, would be expected to 
result in a higher number of bonds underwritten. Indeed, a closer analysis reveals that about 
97.8% of the study’s underlying bond issues were underwritten by the top 10 banks, which 
either assumed the role of the lead manager or a syndicate member. In addition, 65.0% of the 
18 
underwriting mandates, whose total number amounts to 95,114, are attributable to the top 10 
banks, while the remaining 35.0% are accounted for by 291 underwriters. In view of these fig-
ures, the positive influence of the affiliation to a top 10 bank on the portfolio fraction of affili-
ated bonds could simply be explained by the fact that the majority of the underwriting mandates 
are assigned to the top 10 banks. In addition, given an increase in the fraction of corporate bonds 
by one percentage point, the fraction of affiliated bond holdings is expected to grow by approx. 
7 basis points (p-value < 0.01). While the impact seems relatively small, the positive sign of 
the coefficient indicates that the exposure to affiliated bond holdings is higher if funds’ invest-
ment choices are directed towards corporate bonds. Considering that the majority of the under-
lying bond issues, specifically about 95%, are attributable to corporate clients, the positive ef-
fect can be considered as a reasonable finding. Apart from the rather weak coefficients for the 
remainder of the variables, their findings are further statistically insignificant and, thus, lack 
explanatory power. In order to examine whether the regression results differ depending on 
funds’ investment style, models (2) to (5) are used to analyse selected sub-categories of funds. 
In addition to the significance of the top 10 bank-affiliation dummy, some evidence can be 
found in model (2), which is based on data on funds that focus on corporate bonds, that the 
fraction of affiliated bond holdings is positively associated with a fund’s TNA (p-value < 0.1). 
For example, a one percentage increase in TNA is expected to result in a rise in the weight of 
affiliated bonds of about 78 basis points. However, with regards to the other predictors used to 
approximate fund size, i.e. the sum of the average TNA of all the funds that belong to the same 
family as well as the absolute number of family funds in the preceding quarter, the coefficients 
remain statistically insignificant in each sub-analysis. 
6.2 How do fund outflows affect the variation in the fraction of (un)affiliated bonds? (H2) 
In order to test H2, three regression equations were estimated, whose results are displayed in 
Table 4. One can see that the presence of negative net flows is associated with a decline in the 
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fraction of unaffiliated bond holdings, which, on average, are expected to be reduced by 19 
basis points from one reporting date to the next (p-value < 0.05). The coefficient of the outflow 
dummy in the regression with the variation in affiliated bond holdings as the dependent variable 
is weaker (-0.011 or 1.1 basis point); the effect is, however, statistically insignificant. The dif-
ference between both variations in the presence of negative fund flows is predicted, ceteris 
paribus, to rise by approx. 18 basis points (p-value < 0.05). With regard to the control variables 
in model (2), the dummy variable capturing affiliation to one of the top 10 banks exhibits a 
positive sign and is highly statistically significant at the 1% level. This result reflects the fact 
that funds, which ultimately belong to one of the top 10 banks in the world, are expected to 
increase their fractions of affiliated bond holdings from one reporting date to the next, ceteris 
paribus. In contrast, the influence of affiliation to one of the top 10 banks on the fraction of 
unaffiliated bonds is negative, confirming the idea that bank-affiliation, more specifically affil-
iation to a top 10 bank, induces a preference of affiliated bonds over unaffiliated bonds. It, thus, 
appears that affiliated funds’ behavior lends support to bonds underwritten by their parent bank, 
indirectly through the reduction of unaffiliated bonds at times of fund outflows and – given the 
affiliation to one of the top 10 banks – directly through the general intension to raise the fraction 
of affiliated bonds and reduce the fraction of unaffiliated bonds from one reporting date to the 
next. The results should, nevertheless, be considered cautiously, since for the majority of fund-
month observations, the fraction of affiliated bonds amounts to zero, which, thus, leads to a 
variation of zero as well and may significantly distort the interpretation of the results obtained. 
6.3 Does the affiliation to a bond’s underwriter impact a fund’s participation in the invest-
ment in that bond in the period after its issuance? (H3) 
In order to verify the assumptions of H3, six regression models are estimated, whose results are 
reported in Table 5. In model (1), which uses time fixed effects, one can see that the affiliation 
to a bond’s underwriting syndicate increases the log odds of investing in that bond in the quarter 
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of its issuance by about 0.17 units (p-value < 0.01), which is equivalent to a transformed per-
centage of about 19.0% (exp(0.174)-1). This result means that a fund that is owned by a bond’s 
underwriter is 19.0% more likely than a fund that is independent from a bond’s underwriter to 
hold a percentage of the offering amount during the quarter of issuance (i.e., the odds of an 
investment in the offering amount is exp(0.174) = 1.19 times that of an independent fund), 
everything else kept constant. A further interesting and anticipated result in model (1) is that as 
a fund’s TNA increases, the likelihood of an investment in a recently issued bond increases as 
well (p-value < 0.01). Next, the aim of models (3) to (6) is to investigate factors that determine 
a fund’s purchased fraction of a bond’s offering amount in the period after its issuance. As can 
be seen in model (3), the affiliation to one of the bond’s underwriters is negatively associated 
with the purchased fraction of the offering amount during the quarter of issuance (p-value < 
0.1). However, the size of the impact is too small to constitute any meaningful association, 
considering that the decrease only amounts to about 2 basis points, everything else being equal. 
One can further see that in model (5), which uses the average acquired fraction of the offering 
amount within one year after the bond’s issuance as the dependent variable, the coefficient of 
the dummy that captures the affiliation to one of the bond’s underwriters is insignificant. Re-
placing the dummy variable that represents the affiliation to the underwriting syndicate by a 
dummy variable that indicates the affiliation to a top 10 bank, which is part of the underwriting 
syndicate (see models (4) and (6)), yields nearly identical results as already discussed. Con-
cluding, the hypothesis postulating affiliated fixed income funds’ investment participation close 
to the issuance of client bonds cannot clearly be supported. While there is evidence that the 
probability of an investment within three months after the issuance increases in the presence of 
the affiliation to a bond’s underwriter, no meaningful association could be detected between 
the affiliation to a bond’s underwriter and the fraction held of that bond’s offering amount in 
the period after the issuance. It may be pointed out that in the U.S. the 1940 Investment 
21 
Company Act and SEC Rule 10(f)-3 (SEC, 2003) define a percentage limit on how an invest-
ment bank is able to allocate securities that it underwrites to its affiliated funds to avoid the 
“misuse” of affiliated funds as a dumping place for securities that are unmarketable (as cited in 
Ritter and Zhang, 2007). The negative sign of the coefficient “aff_bondf,b,q(iss)” may, thus, seem 
reasonable (as funds independent from a bond’s underwriter are allowed to acquire a larger 
percentage of the offering amount), however, considering the negligible effect size, it cannot 
be said that such official regulations actually seem to be reflected in the current analysis. 
6.4 Can performance differences within fixed income funds be attributed to the portfolio 
weight of affiliated bond holdings or bond underwriter-affiliation? (H4, H5) 
The regression outputs, which are used to verify the last two hypotheses, are illustrated in Table 
6 and Table 7. As can be seen from the results from the main model (1) in Table 6, which only 
includes the underwriter-affiliated subsample, the estimated coefficients of the variables of in-
terest (“frac_afff,t”, “aff_top_10f,t”) are insignificant. The proposed hypotheses that assume the 
portfolio weight of client bond holdings as well as the affiliation to a top 10 bank to have an 
effect on affiliated fixed income funds’ returns can overall, thus, not be evidenced. However, 
in the subsample analysis’ model (2), it is noticeable that funds owned by a top 10 bank under-
writing institution with a focus on short-term bonds realise a slight underperformance in relation 
to stand-alone peers (-15 bps per quarter), which can be considered as supportive of the conflict-
of-interest hypothesis (H5). On the other hand, top 10 bank-affiliated fixed income funds whose 
asset focus is on intermediate core bonds, as demonstrated in model (5), are able to earn slightly 
higher returns (+15 bps per quarter), which could indicate their ability to trade on an informa-
tional advantage (H4). Next, if one looks at the control variables, it is noteworthy that in the 
main model (1) the coefficient of the age variable (p-value < 0.01), i.e. years since the fund’s 
inception date, is negative. Despite the fairly minimal impact, the negative direction of the age 
effect could indicate younger fixed income funds’ higher agility and greater determination to 
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attain a better performance to survive (Ferreira, Keswani, Ramos and Miguel, 2013). Contem-
porary fund performance (“cum_returnf,q”) has a positive and significant impact on future fund 
performance (p-value < 0.01), implying that success in the past is expected to persist in the 
future, which is consistent with the results from previous research papers published by Ferreira 
et al. (2013, 2018). Expressed in figures, an increase in the current cumulative quarterly return 
of one percentage point, ceteris paribus, translates into an increase in the next cumulative quar-
terly return of approx. 24 basis points. As can further be seen, the sign of the net flow coefficient 
is negative, which is inconsistent with the “smart money” effect relating to funds’ investors’ 
ability to select better-performing funds (Gruber, 1996 as cited in Zheng, 1999). One explana-
tion for this result could be the possible reduction in costs that are associated with trading and 
information gathering following the reduction in the assets managed by a fund and, thereby, 
leading to a rise in its performance (Berk and Green, 2004). From the main model (1) in Table 
7, based on the entire sample of funds, it can further be observed that the coefficient of the 
portfolio weight in cash holdings has a negative sign (p-value < 0.05), however, due to the 
rather weak effect size, which is close to zero, the variable does not seem to constitute a valuable 
addition to the model. Nevertheless, the negative sign appears reasonable if one considers 
cash’s lower risk in contrast to bond or equity investments, as a result of which it is associated 
with a lower return option (“BlackRock”, n.d.). Further, from the sub-analyses in models (2) 
and (5) that focus on corporate bond funds (2) as well intermediate core bond funds (5) evidence 
arises that fund size has a positive influence on fund performance (p-value < 0.1), which could 
be a possible result of bigger funds’ ability to negotiate better spreads and distribute their fixed 
costs across a larger asset base (Ferreira et al., 2013). Lastly, one can see that the effect of the 
variable of interest, top 10 bank-affiliation, on future returns is insignificant, due to which both 
previously formulated hypotheses (H4, H5) cannot be supported. Indeed, one could say that the 
results are rather consistent with the existence of “Chinese walls” (Kenton, 2020) between 
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investment banks’ debt underwriting and asset management units that aim to block communi-
cations and allow them to operate independently from each other. In line with this, re-running  
model (1) of Table 7 and using underwriter-affiliation in general or affiliation to other under-
writing firms instead of top 10 bank-affiliation as the independent variable likewise does not 
yield any significant association between funds’ returns and underwriter-affiliation (Table 8). 
7 CONCLUSION 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, enacted in 1999, has not only advanced the field of universal 
banking in the U.S., but also intensified the potential for conflicts of interest in a financial in-
stitution to arise (JM, 2009). As a result, several studies have been eager to explore how asset 
management firms’ affiliation to a conglomerate that offers diverse financial services under the  
same roof affects their trading behavior and performance in comparison to independent ones. 
As prior research has mainly focused on equity mutual funds (e.g., Massa and Rehman, 2008; 
Ferreira et al., 2018), the aim of this thesis was to investigate the question of how bond under-
writer-affiliation affects fixed income funds’ investment choice and returns. The main results 
are that (i) affiliated fixed income funds slightly overweight affiliated bond holdings, (ii) which 
is especially the case for top 10 bank-affiliated funds, however (iii) only in 2.3% of all fund-
month pairs, the affiliated portfolio weight matches the portfolio weight that was underwritten 
by the most frequent underwriter, which clearly indicates that affiliated bond funds do not bias 
their portfolios towards – and thereby also do not “please” – bonds their parent bank acted as 
an underwriter for. In addition, as the chances of a fund investing in a bond in the quarter of its 
issuance increases in the presence of the affiliation to the bond’s underwriting syndicate, (iv) it 
could be inferred that underwriting firms are supported by their asset management units in plac-
ing underwritten bonds on the market. While (v) further signs of support are noticeable at the 
time of negative fund flows, which are associated with a reduction in unaffiliated bond hold-
ings, (vi) performance, probably the most essential statistics included in funds’ factsheets, is 
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neither statistically influenced by the portfolio weight of affiliated bonds nor the affiliation to 
an underwriter. This suggest that the control of bond funds by investment banks that are en-
gaged in bond underwriting activities results, thus, in no major benefit, but also no disadvantage 
to funds’ shareholders. At this point, one needs to bear in mind that several of the introduced 
studies that investigate conflicts of interest within investment banks’ asset management arms 
were carried out several years ago, with the underlying datasets being much older (e.g. JM, 
2009; Hao and Yan, 2012). In their study from 2012, Hao and Yan mentioned that investment 
banks would consider their less lucrative asset management business as a possibility to prop up 
their services in the areas of underwriting and advisory, which have lucrative fees. In previous 
years, however, the importance of global banks’ asset management units has strongly increased 
due to the stable fee income, regulatory requirements as a response to the financial crisis and 
demographic changes (e.g. ageing populations in developed countries) that led to a direction of 
money towards retirement and savings products (Marriage, 2015). A Financial Times article 
(Flood, 2020) further reports that Wall Street’s asset management units rank among lucrative 
fee earners nowadays that generate high profit margins. In addition, very recently, the most 
reputable names Goldman Sachs as well as Morgan Stanley have endeavoured to transform 
their product offerings towards more durable earnings to reduce their exposure to volatile in-
vestment banking fees (Financial Times, 2020b). Hence, considering the apparent growing im-
portance of asset management arms to financial groups’ total earnings, the lack of influence of 
affiliated bond holdings and underwriter-affiliation on fixed income funds’ returns could pos-
sibly in part be explained by the fact that investment banks’ incentive to “misuse” affiliated 
funds in favor of the underwriting business is not as present anymore as in the past. Further, 
Ferreira et al. (2018) found evidence for a stricter enforcement of “Chinese walls” and a better 
protection of the rights of funds’ investors in common-law countries, such as the U.S., which 
could be another explanation for the results attained in this study. Lastly, one needs to consider 
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that the conducted analyses are subject to a few limitations and could surely be improved on 
certain points, which would, however, have gone beyond the scope of this thesis. As the regres-
sion analyses were conducted for illustrative purposes only, they are not to be compared with 
more sophisticated research papers, which take into account a broader set of control variables 
and implement additional robustness checks to assure the plausibility of the gained estimates. 
Also, due to the scope of this thesis, it was not verified whether the study’s underlying variables 
fulfil the assumptions that are necessary to justify the use of a linear regression model (e.g. 
homoscedasticity) (Prabhakaran, n.d.). As a result, one has to be careful with the interpretations 
of the results and any derived conclusions. In addition, as this thesis’ definition of “affiliated 
bonds” includes bonds underwritten by the umbrella institution as a lead underwriter as well as 
syndicate member, the analyses of future research could concentrate on lead bond underwrit-
ers only. As stated by Hao and Yan (2012), lead underwriting firms have the highest amount of 
reputational capital involved in IPOs and SEOs and, thus, it would be interesting to see if the 
results turn out differently if one limits the dataset on bond issuances to lead underwriters only. 
Further, as an investment bank acts as an intermediary in the secondary market as well, the 
trading behavior of affiliated bond funds could be analysed in situations where their controlling 
bank is faced with selling or buying pressure. As a final point, forthcoming works may focus 
on bond funds that are domiciled outside the U.S., where bank-affiliation is a more prevalent 
phenomenon, or in civil-law countries, where investors’ rights were found to be less protected 
(Ferreira et al., 2018). In view of these considerations, it becomes evident that a number of 
future studies are required to shed light more thoroughly on the effect of underwriter-affiliation 
on the investment choices of fixed income funds, which represent a significant economic inter-
est, not only in the sample funds’ country of domicile, the United States, but also globally14. 
 
14 The share of the worldwide total assets under management ($47.9tn) attributable to bond funds ($10.8tn) 
amounted to about 22.5% at the end of the first quarter 2020 (International Investment Funds Association, 2020). 
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Source: Own analysis based on data retrieved from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities database   
































Source: Own analysis based on data retrieved from the Morningstar database as well as Mergent Fixed Income Securities database  
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Source: Own analysis based on data retrieved from the Morningstar database as well as Mergent Fixed Income Securities database   
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Source: Own analysis based on data retrieved from the Morningstar database as well as Mergent Fixed Income Securities database   
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Source: Own analysis based on data retrieved from the Morningstar database as well as Mergent Fixed Income Securities database   
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2. TABLES 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the dataset, on which the empirical analysis in this thesis is based; the sample period is January 2003 to October 2019. If the variable 
is used in one of the subsequent regressions, its abbreviation is specified next to the full name. The table consists of five Panels, with Panel A illustrating the average values of 
the characteristics on the basis of all sample fund-month pairs. Panel B depicts the average values of selected characteristics separately for the underwriter-unaffiliated fund-
month pairs (a) and underwriter-affiliated fund-month pairs (b). Panel C displays additional statistics for affiliated fixed income funds, while Panel D further describes the 
subsample of affiliated fixed income funds by splitting it into top 10 bank-affiliated funds (a) and other underwriter-affiliated funds (b). Lastly, Panel E summarises the mean 
characteristics of funds that belong to selected investment style categories, as assigned by Morningstar. 
 Panel A: Fund- and portfolio-specific characteristics of all sample funds 
 
Variable full name 












     No. of 
       obs. 
Affiliation with a bond underwriting firm (1/0) n/a 0.22  0.00  0.41  0.00  1.00  101,837  
Affiliation with a top 10 bank (1/0) aff_top_10 0.07  0.00  0.25  0.00  1.00  101,837  
Age (years) age 13.41  11.66  10.34  0.25  42.37  101,711  
TNA ($mn) TNA 1,889.84  330.50  8,440.57  3.42  26,835.04  99,092  
Net flow ($mn) net_flow 9.29  0.02  191.34  (238.28) 445.18  98,907  
Net flow ($mn) in % of TNA ($mn) relative_net_flow (10.28) 0.04  2,296.52  (18.78) 28.55  98,892  
Negative fund flows (1/0) neg_net_flow 0.49  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00  98,907  
Expense ratio (%) expense_ratio 0.47  0.39  1.46  (1.45) 2.71  99,009  
Weight of cash (%) n/a 4.63  2.87  15.75  (33.22) 55.67  101,836  
Weight of cash incl. bonds with a maturity of less than 1 year (%) frac_cash 9.32  6.28  17.74  (27.53) 70.42  101,836  
Weight of plain corporate bonds (%) frac_corp_bonds 42.21  36.19  35.77  0.00  98.27  101,836  
Weight attributable to the most frequent underwriting firm (%) n/a 14.78  11.35  14.98  0.00  49.48  101,837  
Cumulative three-month (quarterly) return (%) cum_return 1.11  1.03  3.00  (7.04) 9.51  51,449  
Share held of a bond's offering amount in the quarter of its iss. (%) frac_off_amt 0.03 0.00 14.99 0.00 0.26 18,980,127 
 
 Panel B: Fund- and portfolio-specific characteristics of underwriter-independent funds (a) vs. underwriter-affiliated funds (b) 
 
Variable full name 
Abbr. (n/a if not used 




            No. of 
            obs. (a) 
 
Mean (b) 
            No. of 
            obs. (b) 
 
Age (years) age   12.98  79,842  14.98  21,869   
TNA ($mn) TNA   1,877.92  77,597  1,932.89  21,495  
(continued) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics – continued 
      
Net flow ($mn) net_flow  9.23  77,456  9.49  21,451  
Net flow ($mn) in % of TNA ($mn) relative_net_flow  (13.17) 77,448  0.13  21,444  
Negative fund flows (1/0) neg_net_flow  0.48  77,456  0.52  21,451  
Expense ratio (%) expense_ratio  0.46  77,487  0.49  21,522  
Weight of cash (%) n/a  4.53  79,904  5.02  21,932  
Weight of cash incl. bonds with a maturity of less than 1 year (%) frac_cash  9.43  79,904  8.92  21,932  
Weight of plain corporate bonds (%) frac_corp_bonds  42.22  79,904  42.19  21,932  
Weight of underwriter-affiliated bonds (%) frac_aff  2.13  79,905  2.61  21,932  
Weight attributable to the most frequent underwriting firm (%) n/a  14.75  79,905  14.92  21,932  
Cumulative three-month (quarterly) return (%) cum_return  1.11  40,448  1.10  11,001  
 
 Panel C: Selected underwriter-affiliated fund- and portfolio-specific characteristics 
 
Variable full name 












     No. of 
       obs. 
No. of family funds no_family_funds 10.09  8.00  6.95  1.00  30.00  11,336  
Average family TNA per quarter ($mn) avg_family_TNA 26,862.79  7,097.87  43,875.45  56.71  181,548.95  11,241  
Weight of underwriter-affiliated bonds (%) frac_aff 2.61  0.00  5.78  0.00  28.26  21,932  
Weight of lead underwriter-affiliated bonds (%) n/a 1.90  0.00  4.64  0.00  23.93  21,932  
Weight of unaffiliated bonds (%) frac_unaff 26.65  19.40  24.17  0.00  87.99  21,932  
Variation (∆) in affiliated bond holdings (ppt) ∆_frac_aff 0.01  0.00  0.82  (1.74) 1.97  21,605  
Variation (∆) in unaffiliated bond holdings (ppt) ∆_frac_unaff 0.14  0.00  5.71  (10.03) 13.27  21,605  
∆ unaffiliated bond holdings less ∆ affiliated bond holdings (ppt) diff_∆_frac_(un)aff 0.13  0.00  5.51  (9.66) 12.09  21,605  
Cumulative three-month (quarterly) return (%) cum_return 1.10  1.03  3.05  (7.02) 9.22  11,001  
 
 Panel D: Fund- and portfolio-specific characteristics of top 10 bank-affiliated funds (a) vs. other underwriter-affiliated funds (b) 
 
Variable full name 
Abbr. (n/a if not used 




            No. of 
            obs. (a) 
 
Mean (b) 
            No. of 
            obs. (b) 
Age (years) age   17.44  6,690  13.89  15,179  
TNA ($mn) TNA   2,108.43  6,532  1,856.25  14,963  
Net flow ($mn) net_flow  5.71  6,527  11.14  14,924  
Net flow ($mn) in % of TNA ($mn) relative_net_flow  (0.41) 6,525  0.37  14,919  
(continued) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics – continued 
      
Negative fund flows (1/0) neg_net_flow  0.57  6,527  0.50  14,924  
Expense ratio (%) expense_ratio  0.66  6,505  0.42  15,017  
Weight of cash (%) n/a  6.11  6,752  4.53  15,180  
Weight of cash incl. bonds with a maturity of less than 1 year (%) frac_cash  9.64  6,752  8.60  15,180  
Weight of plain corporate bonds (%) frac_corp_bonds  40.89  6,752  42.77  15,180  
Weight of underwriter-affiliated bonds (%) frac_aff  7.80  6,752  0.30  15,180  
Weight of lead underwriter-affiliated bonds (%) n/a  5.91  6,752  0.11  15,180  
Weight of unaffiliated bonds (%) frac_unaff  21.13  6,752  29.10  15,180  
Cumulative three-month (quarterly) return (%) cum_return  1.08  3,233  1.11  7,768  
 
 Panel E: Mean values of fund- and portfolio-specific characteristics of selected fund style categories 
 
Variable full name 










   Nontrad. 
   Bond 
  Bank 
  Loan 
Age (years) age 15.48  13.04  13.95  14.37  6.45  7.45  
 No. of obs.  4,452  20,393  17,652  23,493  5,134  4,621  
TNA ($mn) TNA 1,128.10  1,086.31  1,482.56  2,385.03  1,394.89  1,863.41  
 No. of obs.  4,421  19,671  16,925  22,727  5,125  4,479  
Net flow ($mn) net_flow 8.16  (0.21) 8.97  16.18  10.18  8.45  
 No. of obs.  4,416  19,647  16,887  22,660  5,113  4,472  
Net flow ($mn) in % of TNA ($mn) relative_net_flow (1.00) (22.65) 0.16  (26.87) 1.49  1.65  
 No. of obs.  4,416  19,641  16,886  22,653  5,113  4,472  
Expense ratio (%) expense_ratio 0.45  0.67  0.29  0.44  0.38  0.45  
 No. of obs.  4,362  19,645  16,885  22,654  5,102  4,476  
Weight of cash (%) n/a 1.89  4.85  4.56  3.76  15.26  5.88  
 No. of obs.  4,452  20,423  17,656  23,540  5,136  4,621  
Weight of cash incl. bonds with a maturity of less than 1 year (%) frac_cash 6.45  6.49  14.12  8.17  23.79  7.18  
 No. of obs.  4,452  20,423  17,656  23,540  5,136  4,621  
Weight of plain corporate bonds (%) frac_corp_bonds 74.69  78.96  31.50  27.51  28.72  24.10  
 No. of obs.  4,452  20,423  17,656  23,540  5,136  4,621  
Weight of underwriter-affiliated bonds (%) frac_aff 4.60  5.53  1.35  0.95  4.32  3.26  
 No. of obs. (affiliated funds only)  983  4,083  4,689  5,881  1,055  952  
Cumulative three-month (quarterly) return (%) cum_return 1.25  1.65  0.62  0.93  0.76  1.06  
No. of obs.  2,398  10,462  10,462  11,503  2,835  2,219  
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Table 2: Description of variables 
The following table provides a definition for each variable that is used in the empirical part of this thesis and, where necessary, a short explanation on their computation is 
provided. The variables are sorted, first, according to their type (dependent variable, independent variable or control variable) and second, in order of appearance in the chapter 
“Research questions and hypotheses development”. 
 
Variable type Variable symbol / abbreviation Variable description 
Dependent variable / 
control variable 
frac_afff,t (%) 
… indicates the portfolio weight of affiliated bond holdings held by fund f at reporting date t. The term “af-
filiated bonds” relates to a set of bonds that were underwritten by the affiliated underwriter / parent bank. 
Dependent variable ∆_frac_unafff,t (ppt15) 
… indicates the absolute change (in percentage points) in a fund f’s portfolio weight of unaffiliated bond 
holdings (i.e. bonds that were not underwritten by the parent bank) between reporting date t and reporting 
date t-1. 
Dependent variable ∆_frac_afff,t (ppt15) 
… indicates the absolute change (in percentage points) in a fund f’s portfolio weight of affiliated bond 
holdings (i.e. bonds that were underwritten by the affiliated underwriter / parent bank) between reporting 
date t and reporting date t-1. 
Dependent variable diff_∆_frac_(un)afff,t (ppt15) 
… indicates the absolute difference (in percentage points) between a fund f’s variation in the weight of un-
affiliated bond holdings “∆_frac_unafff,t” and a fund f’s variation in the weight of affiliated bond holdings 
“∆_frac_afff,t”. 
The formula is computed as follows: diff_∆_frac_(un)afff,t = ∆_frac_unafff,t – ∆_frac_afff,t. 
Dependent variable inv_off_amtf,b,q(iss) (1/0) 
… denotes a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a fund f holds a fraction of a bond b’s offering 
amount (i.e. if the fund invested in the offering amount) during the bond’s quarter of issuance q(iss) (a fund 
f’s last available reporting information on the number of shares held in bond b in the quarter of issuance 
q(iss) is considered) and 0 otherwise. 
 
15 ppt = percentage points 
(continued) 
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Table 2: Description of variables – continued 
Variable type Variable symbol / abbreviation Variable description 
Dependent variable frac_off_amtf,b,q(iss) (%) 
… indicates the fraction of a bond b’s offering amount that is held by fund f during the bond’s quarter of 
issuance q(iss) (a fund f’s last available reporting information on the number of shares held in bond b in the 
quarter of issuance q(iss) is considered). 
Dependent variable avg_frac_off_amtf,b,t(iss)+12m (%) 
… indicates the average fraction of a bond b’s offering amount that is held by fund f within one year after 
its issuance (t(iss)+12m) at point in time t. 
Dependent variable / 
control variable 
cum_returnf,q (%) 
… denotes a fund f’s cumulative three month return in quarter q. The following formula is used: cum_re-
turnf,q = [(1 + return 1st month) * (1+ return 2nd month) * (1 + return 3rd month) – 1] * 100. Further, the 
monthly returns at the fund date level represent weighted averages of returns at the level of a fund’s share 
classes, which were weighted in proportion to their total net assets. 
Independent variable / 
control variable 
log(TNAf,t) … equals the logarithmic value of a fund f’s total net assets at point in time t. 
Independent variable / 
control variable 
log(avg_family_TNAf,q) 
… equals the logarithmic value of the sum of the average total net assets per quarter q of the individual 
funds that are affiliated to the same underwriter as fund f in quarter q, including the average total net assets 
of fund f in quarter q. 
Independent variable / 
control variable 
no_family_fundsf,q 
… equals the absolute number of funds that are affiliated to the same underwriter as fund f in quarter q, in-




Table 2: Description of variables – continued 
Variable type Variable symbol / abbreviation Variable description 
Independent variable / 
control variable 
aff_top_10f,t (1/0) 
… represents a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a fund f is affiliated to an underwriter at point in 
time t, which belongs to one of the top 10 banks and 0 otherwise. Underwriting firms are considered as a 
“top 10 bank” if their name is included in the Financial Times League Tables ranking on the basis of fees 
earned as of 28-Sep-20 (Financial Times, 2020a). 
Independent variable neg_net_flowf,t (1/0) 
… represents a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a fund f experiences negative net flows at point in 
time t and 0 otherwise. 
Independent variable aff_bondf,b,q(iss) (1/0) 
… represents a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a fund f is affiliated to a bond b’s underwriter dur-
ing the quarter of its issuance q(iss) and 0 otherwise. 
Independent variable aff_top_10_bondf,b,q(iss) (1/0) 
… represents a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a fund f is affiliated to a top 10 bank, which is in-
cluded in bond b’s underwriting syndicate during the quarter of its issuance q(iss) and 0 otherwise. 
Control variable relative_net_flowf,t (%) … denotes a fund f’s net flows at point in time t as a percentage of its total net assets at reporting date t. 
Control variable expense_ratiof,t (%) 
… denotes the gross expense ratio of a fund f at point in time t. As the data on expense ratios are only avail-
able at the share class level, the implied expense ratio at the fund level at point in time t is derived by 
weighting the individual expense ratios of share classes (as of point in time t) that are part of fund f propor-
tionally to their total net assets at point in time t. In order to illustrate one example, the weighted average 




Table 2: Description of variables – continued 
Variable type Variable symbol / abbreviation Variable description 
Control variable expense_ratiof,t (%) 
expense_ratiot = [(expense_ratio_At * size_At) + expense_ratio_Bt * size_Bt)] / (size_At  + size_Bt). 
In addition, it must be remarked that the share classes’ expense ratios are not always reported each month. 
On that note, an average expense ratio per share class and year is computed and used for each “share class - 
reporting date” observation during a respective year. 
Control variable agef,t (years) 
… equals the age of fund f at point in time t. In particular, as the share classes within a fund have different 
inception dates, the age is computed by deducting the oldest inception date for a fund f (thus the oldest in-
ception date of a specific share class within fund f) from the current reporting date t. 
Control variable frac_cashf,t (%) 
… indicates the portfolio weight of cash and cash equivalents (including bonds with a maturity of less than 
one year) held by fund f at reporting date t. 
Control variable frac_corp_bondsf,t (%) … indicates the portfolio weight of plain corporate bonds held by fund f at reporting date t. 
Control variable frac_unafff,t (%) 
… indicates the portfolio weight of unaffiliated bonds (i.e. bonds that were not underwritten by a fund’s 
affiliated underwriter / parent bank) held by fund f at reporting date t. 
Control variable log(avg_TNAf,b,q(iss)) 
… indicates the logarithmic value of a fund f’s average total net assets during a certain bond b’s quarter of 
issuance q(iss). The value of a fund’s quarterly average total net assets is computed by dividing the sum of 





Table 2: Description of variables – continued 
Variable type Variable symbol / abbreviation Variable description 
Control variable sum_net_flowf,b,q(iss) ($) 
… indicates the sum of net flows witnessed by a fund f during a certain bond b’s quarter of issuance q(iss). 
The value of a fund’s quarterly sum of net flow is computed by summing up the net flows experienced at 
each reporting date during a respective quarter. 
Control variable avg_expense_ratiof,b,q(iss) (%) 
… indicates the average expense ratio of a fund f during a certain bond b’s quarter of issuance q(iss). A 
fund’s average expense ratio in a respective quarter is computed by dividing the sum of the expense ratios 
reported during that quarter (calculated as weighted averages of a fund’s share classes’ expense ratios, see 
variable “expense_ratiof,t”) by the number of expense ratios available during that quarter. 
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Table 3: Portfolio weight of affiliated bond holdings 
Does fund size influence the fraction of affiliated bond holdings? 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects linear regressions using the portfolio fraction of affiliated 
bond holdings (frac_afff,t) as the dependent variable, a set of independent variables to capture different proxies 
for fund size (i.e., log(TNAf,t), log(avg_family_TNAf,q-1), no_family_fundsf,q-1 and aff_top_10f,t) and a set of 
fund- and portfolio-specific control variables (i.e., relative_net_flowf,t, expense_ratiof,t, agef,t, frac_cashf,t and 
frac_corp_bondsf,t). A precise definition of all the variables used can be found in Table 2. As the sample funds 
are characterised by different reporting frequencies, the fund family variables relate to the quarter preceding 
point in time t. Model (1), which considers all affiliated fund-month pairs, is based on style (Morningstar cate-
gory) and time (reporting date) fixed effects. Models (2) to (5) represent sub-analyses of funds that focus on 
corporate bonds (2), high yield bonds (3), short-term bonds (4) and intermediate core bonds (5). In each regres-
sion model, standard errors (stated in the parentheses) are clustered at the fund as well as time (reporting date) 
level. A 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 frac_afff,t (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log(TNAf,t) 0.038 0.777* 0.739 -0.332 -0.124 
 (0.183) (0.380) (0.591) (0.235) (0.095) 
log(avg_family_TNAf,q-1) 0.107 0.506 -0.332 0.717 0.098 
 (0.202) (0.616) (0.353) (0.484) (0.109) 
no_family_fundsf,q-1 -0.026 -0.101 0.030 -0.122 -0.025 
 (0.045) (0.198) (0.092) (0.088) (0.022) 
aff_top_10f,t (=1) 7.709*** 18.436*** 14.929*** 4.888*** 3.076*** 
 (0.823) (4.212) (2.203) (1.258) (0.508) 
relative_net_flowf,t (%) -0.002 0.001 0.013 -0.001 -0.010* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.001) (0.006) 
expense_ratiof,t (%) 0.001 0.204 0.036 0.794 -0.004 
 (0.032) (0.839) (0.053) (0.599) (0.014) 
agef,t (years) -0.008 -0.084 -0.017 -0.078 0.003 
 (0.027) (0.073) (0.052) (0.056) (0.011) 
frac_cashf,t (%) 0.010 -0.038 -0.034 -0.017 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.048) (0.057) (0.015) (0.005) 
frac_corp_bondsf,t (%) 0.071*** 0.040 0.123*** 0.065* 0.024* 
 (0.018) (0.053) (0.041) (0.033) (0.014) 
Style fixed effects yes no no no no 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 21,007 946 3,908 4,577 5,484 
Adjusted R2 0.499 0.715 0.654 0.429 0.483 
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Table 4: Change in the portfolio weight of affiliated / unaffiliated bond holdings at the time of fund outflows 
How do fund outflows affect the variation in the fraction of (un)affiliated bonds? 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects linear regressions using the change in a fund’s portfolio 
fraction of unaffiliated bond holdings between t and t-1 (∆_frac_unafff,t), the change in a fund’s portfolio fraction 
of affiliated bond holdings between t and t-1 (∆_frac_afff,t) and the difference in both variations at point in time 
t (diff_∆_frac_(un)afff,t) as the dependent variables, a dummy variable that captures the presence of negative fund 
flows as the independent variable (neg_net_flowf,t) and a set of fund- and portfolio-specific control variables (i.e., 
log(TNAf,t), log(avg_family_TNAf,q-1), no_family_fundsf,q-1, aff_top_10f,t, expense_ratiof,t, agef,t, frac_cashf,t, 
frac_corp_bondsf,t, frac_afff,t and frac_unafff,t). A precise definition of each variable used can be found in Table 
2. All models include style (Morningstar category) as well as time (reporting date) fixed effects and standard 
errors (stated in the parentheses) clustered at the fund as well as time (reporting date) level. A 10%, 5%, and 1% 





          ∆_frac_afff,t 
          (ppt) 
diff_∆_frac_(un)afff,t 
(ppt) 
 (1)           (2) (3) 
neg_net_flowf,t (=1) -0.187**           -0.011 -0.176** 
 (0.072)           (0.010) (0.070) 
log(TNAf,t) 0.032           0.003 0.030 
 (0.048)            (0.004) (0.047) 
log(avg_family_TNAf,q-1) -0.123           0.001 -0.124 
 (0.093)            (0.007) (0.091) 
no_family_fundsf,q-1 -0.012           -0.002 -0.010 
 (0.023)            (0.002) (0.023) 
aff_top_10f,t (=1) -0.428*           0.159*** -0.588** 
 (0.242)            (0.046) (0.227) 
expense_ratiof,t (%) 0.034*           0.002 0.032* 
 (0.020)            (0.003) (0.017) 
agef,t (years) 0.007*           0.00003 0.007* 
 (0.004)            (0.001) (0.004) 
frac_cashf,t (%) 0.027**           0.002*** 0.025* 
 (0.013)            (0.001) (0.013) 
frac_corp_bondsf,t (%) 0.026           0.002 0.025 
 (0.041)            (0.002) (0.039) 
frac_afff,t (%) -0.040           -0.020*** -0.020 
 (0.050)            (0.006) (0.047) 
frac_unafff,t (%) -0.095**           -0.004 -0.092** 
 (0.041)            (0.003) (0.040) 
Style fixed effects yes           yes yes 
Time fixed effects yes           yes yes 
Observations 20,753           20,753 20,753 
Adjusted R2 0.079           0.027 0.075 
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Table 5: Fixed income funds’ investment participation in bonds’ quarter of issuance and within one year after their issuance 
Does the affiliation to a bond’s underwriter impact a fund’s participation in the investment in that bond in the period after its issuance? 
This table depicts the results from a set of regressions that aim to analyse the factors influencing a fund’s investment (abbr. “inv”) participation in a bond in the period after its 
issuance (abbr. “iss”). The participation of a fund is proxied by two variables: a dummy variable assuming the value 1 if a fund holds a fraction of a bond’s offering amount in 
the quarter of its issuance and 0 otherwise, see models (1) and (2), and the percentage of a bond’s offering amount held by a fund in the quarter of the bond’s issuance, see 
models (3) and (4). As an alternative to models (3) and (4), models (5) and (6) use the percentage of a bond’s offering amount held, on average, within one year after its issuance. 
Models (1) and (2) are both logistic regressions models that were computed using the R package bife, which allows for the inclusion of one fixed effect in a logistic model. 
Models (3) to (6) are based on felm regressions, including CUSIP as well as time (year-quarter) fixed effects and standard errors (stated in the parentheses) clustered at the 
CUSIP as well as time (year-quarter) level. The independent variables (i.e., affiliation to a bond’s underwriter and affiliation to a top 10 bank, which is part of a bond’s 




 inv_off_amtf,b,q(iss) (=1) frac_off_amtf,b,q(iss) (%) avg_frac off_amtf,b,t(iss)+12m (%) 
 logistic felm felm 
                (1)                                  (2)   (3)              (4) (5) (6) 
aff_bondf,b,q(iss) (=1) 0.174*** 0.070*** -0.019* 
 -0.081  
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.064)  
aff_top_10_bondf,b,q(iss) (=1) 
   -0.022*  -0.091 
    (0.012)  (0.074) 
log(avg_TNAf,b,q(iss)) 0.266*** 0.275*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.043) (0.043) 
sum_net_flowf,b,q(iss) ($) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
avg_expense_ratiof,b,q(iss) (%) 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.006 0.006 0.041 0.041 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.030) (0.030) 
CUSIP fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effects yes no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 18,550,354 15,544,532 18,550,354 18,550,354 18,550,354 18,550,354 
Adjusted R2   0.017 0.017 0.010 0.010 
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Table 6: Analysis of differences in performance within the subsample of affiliated fixed income funds 
Can performance differences within fixed income funds be attributed to the portfolio weight of affiliated bond 
holdings or bond underwriter-affiliation? – Part 1 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects linear regressions using affiliated funds’ three-month cumu-
lative return in the next quarter as the dependent variable. The portfolio weight of affiliated bonds (%) as well as 
a dummy variable that captures the affiliation to a top 10 bank (=1) constitute the independent variables. A set of 
fund- and portfolio-specific variables is controlled for (i.e., TNA, net flow, expense ratio, age, portfolio fraction 
of cash holdings and cumulative return of the current quarter), all of which are elaborated in more detail in Table 
2. While the dependent variable (“cum_returnf,q+1”) represents a cumulative value for the next quarter, the inde-
pendent and control variables relate to specific reporting dates at point in time t (with the exception of the cumu-
lative return of the current quarter q). A fund’s cumulative return in a respective quarter is, thus, used as the 
dependent variable for each fund-month observation of a fund during that quarter. Model (1), which is the main 
analysis, is based on style (Morningstar category) and time (reporting date) fixed effects. Models (2) to (5) con-
stitute sub-analyses of funds that focus on corporate bonds (2), high yield bonds (3), short-term bonds (4) and 
intermediate core bonds (5); time fixed effects (reporting date) are included. In each regression model, standard 
errors (stated in the parentheses) are clustered at the fund as well as time (reporting date) level. A 10%, 5%, and 
1% level of significance is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 cum_returnf,q+1 (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
frac_afff,t (%) 0.0004 -0.0001 0.005 0.012
** -0.050 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.033) 
aff_top_10f,t (=1) -0.025 0.054 -0.070 -0.152
* 0.151** 
 (0.052) (0.204) (0.141) (0.085) (0.069) 
log(TNAf,t) 0.0005 0.031 -0.018 -0.020 0.014 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) 
net_flowf,t ($) -0.000
** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
expense_ratiof,t (%) 0.002 0.142 -0.001 -0.070 0.0004 
 (0.002) (0.081) (0.002) (0.144) (0.0004) 
agef,t (years) -0.002
*** 0.002 0.0004 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
frac_cashf,t (%) -0.001 -0.007 -0.010 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
cum_returnf,q (%) 0.238*** 0.090 0.271*** 0.350*** 0.338*** 
 (0.076) (0.113) (0.084) (0.081) (0.095) 
Style fixed effects yes no no no no 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 20,530 936 3,812 4,481 5,296 
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.839 0.890 0.528 0.698 
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Table 7: Analysis of differences in performance between affiliated and unaffiliated fixed income funds 
Can performance differences within fixed income funds be attributed to the portfolio weight of affiliated bond 
holdings or bond underwriter-affiliation? – Part 2 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects linear regressions using funds’ three-month cumulative return 
in the next quarter as the dependent variable. A dummy variable that captures the affiliation to a top 10 bank (=1)  
constitutes the independent variable. A set of fund- and portfolio-specific variables is controlled for (i.e., TNA, 
net flow, expense ratio, age, portfolio fraction of cash holdings and cumulative return of the current quarter), all 
of which are elaborated in more detail in Table 2. While the dependent variable (“cum_returnf,q+1”) represents a 
cumulative value for the next quarter, the independent and control variables relate to specific reporting dates at 
point in time t (with the exception of the cumulative return of the current quarter q). A fund’s cumulative return 
in a respective quarter is, thus, used as the dependent variable for each fund-month observation of a fund during 
that quarter. Model (1), which is the main analysis, is based on style (Morningstar category) and time (reporting 
date) fixed effects. Models (2) to (5) constitute sub-analyses of funds that focus on corporate bonds (2), high 
yield bonds (3), short-term bonds (4) and intermediate core bonds (5); time fixed effects (reporting date) are 
included. In each regression model, standard errors (stated in the parentheses) are clustered at the fund as well as 
time (reporting date) level. A 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 cum_returnf,q+1 (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
aff_top_10f,t (=1) -0.008 0.030 0.002 -0.098 -0.016 
 (0.028) (0.046) (0.068) (0.077) (0.055) 
log(TNAf,t) 0.010 0.023
* -0.006 -0.004 0.018*** 
 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) 
net_flowf,t ($) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
expense_ratiof,t (%) 0.004 0.018 -0.001 -0.010 0.001
* 
 (0.005) (0.038) (0.002) (0.032) (0.0005) 
agef,t (years) -0.001 -0.002 0.0004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
frac_cashf,t (%) -0.004
** -0.005* -0.009** -0.001 -0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
cum_returnf,q (%) 0.203*** 0.244*** 0.221*** 0.291*** 0.352*** 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.054) (0.072) (0.092) 
Style fixed effects yes no no no no 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 94,501 4,219 18,835 16,159 21,154 
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.800 0.877 0.483 0.718 
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Table 8: Analysis of differences in performance between aff. and unaff. fixed income funds (alternative) 
Can performance differences within fixed income funds be attributed to the portfolio weight of affiliated bond 
holdings or bond underwriter-affiliation? – Part 2 (alternative) 
This table depicts the results from the fixed effects linear regressions using funds’ three-month cumulative return 
in the next quarter as the dependent variable. A dummy variable that captures the affiliation to a bond underwriter 
/ “afff,t” (model(1)) and the affiliation to any bond underwriter that does not rank among the top 10 banks / 
“aff_not_top_10f,t” (model(2)) constitute the independent variables. A set of fund- and portfolio-specific varia-
bles is controlled for (TNA, net flow, expense ratio, age, portfolio fraction of cash holdings and cumulative return 
of the current quarter). While the dependent variable (“cum_returnf,q+1”) represents a cumulative value for the 
next quarter, the independent and control variables relate to specific reporting dates at point in time t (with the 
exception of the cumulative return of the current quarter q). A fund’s cumulative return in a respective quarter 
is, thus, used as the dependent variable for each fund-month observation of a fund during that quarter. Both 
models are based on style (Morningstar category) and time (reporting date) fixed effects. In each regression 
model, standard errors (stated in the parentheses) are clustered at the fund as well as time (reporting date) level. 
A 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 cum_returnf,q+1 (%) 
 (1) (2) 
afff,t (=1) 0.013 
 
 (0.017)  
aff_not_top_10f,t (=1) 
 0.022 
  (0.021) 
log(TNAf,t) 0.010 0.010 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
net_flowf,t ($) 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
expense_ratiof,t (%) 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
agef,t (years) -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
frac_cashf,t (%) -0.004
** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
cum_returnf,q (%) 0.203*** 0.203*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) 
Style fixed effects yes yes 
Time fixed effects yes yes 
Observations 94,501 94,501 
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.492 
 
 
